“We have no seniors or juniors; we simply respect each other” is among the many bold phrases Vladimir Putin used at the 16^th BRICS+ summit in Russia’s city of Kazan. Despite concerted Western efforts to isolate it, Moscow (and others) reemphasized their defiance to operate outside what they consider to be an unjust, West-led international system. 
The 16^th BRICS+ summit in Kazan, attended by 35 countries of which the majority were represented by “high-level delegations,” showed that a significant number of states echo this feeling, traditionally associated with the likes of Russia and China. It appears that this somehow came as a surprise to Western policymakers—an illustration (hardly the first one) that their attempts to isolate Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine are not working. 
The Kazan summit was used as an opportunity by key non-Western leaders to emphasize a shared appetite for a new way of ‘doing things’ internationally. The core of the discussions that took place were focused on ways to challenge the dominance of the U.S. dollar as the world’s primary currency on the international stage. This, the argument went, was a reaction to America’s increasing abuse of its extraordinary privilege as the currency’s “host”—namely, its use as a political weapon to weaken and isolate its rivals from the international financial system. 
However, this is just one (albeit hugely important) aspect of a broader and now consolidated dissatisfaction with the ‘West-led’ order. The origin of this misalignment stems from a feeling that the international order is shaped and guided by Western rather than international rules. This, like in the dollar issue, allows powerful Western states to impose their views on the rest of the international community. This undermines the interests of all those countries that, according to rules they did not establish, are considered ‘unfit’ for the Western order at the heart of which is the United States and its extremely powerful apparatus. 
BRICS+ and the present-day momentum behind the platform is reflective of a broader shift to multipolarity on the international arena. The BRICS represent an unconventional attempt to establish ‘alternative’ ways of operating. This new ‘way’, as per the formulation of leading BRICS leaders, is built on commonly established processes that are the product of mutual cooperation and not the imposition of a certain system by the more powerful side (as was the United States at the end of the Cold War). 
Kazan, both in terms of magnitude and universal coverage, represents an uncomfortable question the West must now confront. In previous instances, the BRICS were treated almost like an official ‘friendship circle’ that brought together powerful leaders that had locked horns with the West. In terms of substance and tangible threats, the limits were visible and were not seen as major causes of concern for Western policymakers. However, as more and more states express interest, the BRICS are destined to generate considerable unease in Western capitals. 
Despite their insistence in Kazan on not adopting an anti-West status, the BRICS case reveals what exactly now makes the ‘Western way’ so unappealing for many. Having successfully formulated their concerns and expressed them on the global stage, the grouping finally appears adequately equipped to introduce genuine alternatives on the international arena. Whether it’s the dollar question or something else, it is difficult to imagine all this momentum not transforming the BRICS into a player that proposes genuine alternatives which the West can no longer simply ignore.   
The Conceptual Basis of BRICS
Composed initially of Brazil, Russia, India, and China, BRIC (as it was first called) was established in 2006. The grouping was formed with the aim of empowering several major states (which have a combined population of 3.5 billion and a combined economy worth 28.5 trillion dollars) who had felt their interests were being underplayed on the ‘international’ stage. Since then, the addition of South Africa in 2011 and of Egypt, Ethiopia and United Arab Emirates in 2024 have expanded the grouping’s core membership. In Kazan, it was reported that around 35 countries have requested to join, several of which are in the process of being allocated ‘partner’ status. 
Through acting as a forum that allows leaders to discuss matters of mutual importance, BRICS summits provide the necessary conditions for states to take ‘ownership’ of matters essential to their national interests. This originated from the realization that core, Western-led international institutions did not sufficiently represent the ‘non-West’. This includes both their regular operations but also their founding principles, a process in which the BRICS are adamant they were unjustifiably overlooked. Therefore, as a countermeasure, these states now believe they convene in an alternative platform where cooperation is carried out without inherent structural restrictions that prioritised a dominant minority. 
As a grouping, BRICS is not restricted or guided by a specific charter or any other kind of document. Instead, it is the political will of its members that drives its agenda and facilitates the encountering of ‘common solutions’ to ‘common problems’. When addressing journalists in Kazan, President Putin was firm in his emphasis on cooperation that in addition to developing deep-rooted diplomatic trust, ensures the bringing of ‘the people’ together. In addition to key matters on the political and economic agendas, the leaders are now keen to foster cultural and societal cooperation in a bid to strengthen the common ground. This includes an extremely broad range of spheres, among which are film and theatre. With over 200 different events held in Kazan both during the summit and in the build-up, the grouping has indicated that its future might be heading away from the ‘transactionalist’ lens many in the West tend view it through.
Kazan showed, particularly through specific conversations on reducing the (mis)use of the dollar, that there is sufficient individual and collective will to overcome the crucial hurdle of implementing the various ideas the members may have. Should leading states succeed in this mission, the grouping will subsequently become a lot harder to ignore. Among the most eye-catching reactions of Western institutions to the consolidation of BRICS was a categorization of the scope of actorness of the organization as ‘limited’. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy reassured colleagues that the BRICS do not possess sufficient capacity to truly ‘influence’ international affairs. Given this revitalized format with an ever-increasing membership base, the dollar issue, elaborated on in Kazan, should therefore be a vital first test of just how much influence these ‘genuine alternatives’ can actually generate. 
The Dollar Question
The summit in Kazan was an important confirmation of what the upcoming and most pressing objectives of BRICS+ will be in the immediate future. Countries like Russia and to some extent, China, are familiar with working without the dollar as both have experience adapting the manner in which they conduct their international financial activity. Russia actually uses non-Western currencies for around 80% of its cross-border transactions. However, it does appear that the often mentioned ‘weaponization’ of the dollar is what has generated the most interest leading up to the summit. In their respective speeches, Putin, Xi Jinping and Iran President Pezeshkian all referred to the interests of the Global South as needing urgent attention, either directly claiming or indirectly hinting that the dollar is an ‘instrument’ of the West. In fact, this issue is portrayed by the leaders as the cornerstone of what is an international financial system that largely ignores the ‘Global South’ and just like the rest of the international system is too narrow-minded. 
A Financial Times source on the last day of the summit reassured Western readers that Western Central Banks are well aware of the intentions of the BRICS+ to minimize expenditure in dollars. They are therefore ready to act accordingly to avoid what they acknowledge might look like a fragmentation of the international payments system. Even before the summit, Russian financial bodies commented on their desire to see a de-politicized BRICS+ payments system that is not US and dollar centric and guarantees cheaper and faster transactions. Crucially, the aim appears to be preventing US banks from serving as ‘correspondent banks’ that are essentially intermediaries in international transactions. This benefits the US, allowing it total monitoring access and leverage. The aim is to ensure that national central banks, as opposed to US-based correspondent or third-party banks, are responsible for cross-border transactions. This is expected to ‘even out the playing field’ and ensure that the interests of parties at both sides of the transaction are not hampered by a third one with an overarching position (the US). 
Brazilian economist Paulo Nogueira, one of the leading founders of the New Development Bank (referred to by some as the BRICS bank), is among several high-profile economists that has urged the countries to carry out as many transactions in national currencies as possible and start contributing to an alternative payment system. Some go as far as calling for a BRICS+ currency, but this has been downplayed by Putin himself, calling for caution and a step-by-step approach that may perhaps be a recognition of the complex task at hand. Hence, ideas are aplenty, and the political will appears present. Nevertheless, it remains crucial to understand where this political will comes from and the extent to which it can turn such alliances into practicable ideas. This will assist with correctly situating BRICS+ within the current international landscape. 
Theoretical Grounding of the Challenge Posed by BRICS+
The reassessment of the legitimacy of the international system stems from a realization that not all states and their respective interests have been fairly represented since the post-Cold War order was created. Essentially, the ‘rules’ that act as the backbone of the Western order are one-sided and highly preferential to those that wrote them. When conversing with journalists a few days before the start of the summit in Kazan, President Putin dismissed claims that BRICS+ is ‘anti-Western’ in its essence. Instead, he referred to and re-stated Indian Prime Minister Modi’s categorization of the alliance as simply ‘not Western’. Hence, the current rules are ‘Western rules’ that the BRICS (and others) had no role in defining. 
Stephen Walt, realist scholar of International Relations, argues that a fundamental determinant of state behaviour is the kind of ‘threat’ states, or a group of states face. Essentially, they will, in an interest protecting and defensive nature, work against what they consider as the greatest threat facing their survival and the fulfilment of their national interests. In the current case, the Western led order, shaped by Western rules, is simply viewed as too detrimental to the interests of the BRICS+. Hence, the BRICS+ is a platform for like-minded actors that share a commitment to establishing new rules which in their eyes are more democratic and actually representative of those that created them. This would ensure a legitimate international system that adequately represents the entire international community.
In a 2014 speech, Putin hinted that the international community risks descending into chaos that has ‘no rules’ if the current ones are not adequately modified and made fairer. This reflects much of the analysis conducted by realist scholars of international relations, implying that international relations are an arena where eventually, ‘zero-sum’ competition becomes the norm. Therefore, should there be an inability to come up with rules shared by all and not the powerful few, competition and dangerous escalation are inevitable. Hence, what is needed is a profound revision of these mentioned rules which results in influential non-Western powers being able to determine how interstate relations should be conducted. The principal objective of BRICS+ is therefore to develop an ‘alternative’ method of building and maintaining relations with each other, at the heart of which are trust, reliability and mutual interest.
A growing disillusionment with Western institutions, accredited with failing to avoid bloodshed in the Middle East, appears to have further empowered the BRICS+ to fast-track this process of shaping ‘alternative alliances’. An increasing number of representatives of the ‘Global South’ appear keen to engage with the grouping, backed up by their enthusiasm in attending Kazan and establishing long-term ties. The end goal appears to be, at least in rhetoric, the pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation that contributes to a new, more inclusive international system where actors treat each other as ‘partners’ and nothing less. 
Is the Claimed “Disillusionment” Real? 
Some surveys and opinion polls indicate that this line of thinking is significantly more widespread than Western policymakers have come to accept. One such example is a survey carried out by an influential Singaporean think tank, the Yusof Ishak Institute, back in April of this year. The results suggest that from its respondents, which included representatives of Southeastern Asian nations, the majority now label China as ‘more important’ on the global stage than the United States. If one was to consider the emphasis placed by scholars on the United States as the global leader back in the 1990s, this is a momentous change. The same can be applied for African countries, highlighting the broadening nature of this trend. Moreover, it appears that various Southeast Asian countries (particularly those with large Muslim populations) identify more closely with Chinese positions on foreign policy issues than with those of the United States. 
This shift, a product of discontent with the state of Western diplomacy, has been coupled with an intense regional agenda consistently designed and implemented by regional powers. This has helped with gradually adapting regional realities to a new, alternative way of ‘doing things’. Most notably, this places emphasis on regional powers leading a larger group of states when it comes to setting the agenda and directly influencing matters that have a clear impact on their national interests. In China’s case, this is visible through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The most recent, 24^th SCO “Heads of State” council, held in Kazakhstan, saw existing momentum being converted into a new series of important agreements across an incredibly broad range of spheres. This includes the agricultural sphere, the implementation of which requires a more “bottom-up” approach than traditional intra-state diplomatic agreements. 
It must also be emphasized that this year’s summit being held in Russia carried special significance given the degree of isolation imposed on Moscow since the start of its war with Ukraine. This includes not just direct material restrictions, but also considerable attention placed by the West on those states that did not follow suit and have since either maintained or enhanced their relationship with Russia. The fact that Russia’s influence in these ‘alternative alliances’ has remained may be indicative of the fact that many states are unwilling to sign up to the ‘us versus them’ discourse pursued by Western analysts when describing the difference between the Western ‘way’ of operating and the non-Western ‘way’. Given that the latter tends to be categorized as flawed, the sharp rise in member applications to join BRICS may indicate that the likes of Russia are certainly not as isolated as some believe them to be. 
This confirms that the international system is now composed of multiple new ‘centres of development’ where the ‘normative ground’ is no longer associated with just the US. The assumption formulated at the end of the Cold War that Western powers were always going to act as the ‘reference point’ for the rest of the ‘less developed’ world has by now been eroded. Other states are able to do more than just fulfil their interests; they are increasingly able to influence the positions of other, still developing actors. A realist interpretation of this reality, as outlined above, predicts a highly competitive environment in which the US will seek to counterbalance the influence of the rising powers in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. This will only further bolster existing and currently developing ‘alternative alliances’, especially given the inevitable and multi-faceted rise of China. Most interestingly for BRICS, it unveils a new period in the organization’s evolution as a more powerful and influential BRICS grouping will almost certainly earn a place in Western geo-strategic planning. 
A Gripping Future Not Without its Own Challenges
BRICS+ enthusiasts have every reason to be satisfied with the current state of affairs, with Kazan representing a previously unseen level of interaction not only between the core members but also ‘partners’ and beyond. Moreover, despite maintaining a peculiar status when it comes to defining them through the lens of international institutions, the BRICS+ already have well-established goals that are expected to drive the agenda in the short-term. 
However, Kazan also revealed that both one’s analysis and expectations must be measured and reflective of just how challenging it is to grapple with such powerful actors and ensure sufficient convergence of their interests. There is some reluctance to engage in the de-dollarization programme, citing the overly ambitious nature of the idea that even China is not fully convinced by. In fact, some of the post-summit debrief may be an indication that what exactly this ‘challenge’ to the dollar will look like remains unclear. None of the major leaders made any explicit reference to an alternative payments system already being built. A major factor that impedes this is the on-going reliance of the markets of the Global South on US imports and the evident stagnation of Chinese imports in recent years. This means it will take considerable time before other currencies can be categorized as true ‘dollar alternatives’, with some time needed before Global South economies become less dependent on their exports.   
According to Bloomberg, India, along with Brazil and the UAE, felt obliged to strike a balance between pro-actively engaging in the format and contributing to an anti-Western stance. Moreover, the absence of Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince was particularly significant given the Russian Foreign Ministry’s categorization of the country as a ‘full member’ of BRICS. The Saudi Foreign Minister did not sign the Kazan declaration, and the head of state did not address the summit in any format. The country’s sources even claim it participated as an ‘invitee’ and not as a full member. 
Moreover, in Kazan, Indian and Chinese leaders held their first bilateral meeting for four years and for the first time since a dispute on the China-India border that resulted in military casualties on both sides. Hence, the bilateral relationships of the BRICS are evidently not without their own differences. Overcoming these is therefore indispensable for the future of the grouping. This highlights that political will and its highly subjective nature is likely to determine just exactly the kind of trajectory the organization ends up pursuing. Should these divisions be sidelined or adequately managed, the range of opportunities will open up significantly and the BRICS+ will gain considerable unpredictability in their operations. 
Conclusion: What Now?
The Kazan summit being joined by 35+ countries proves that interest in BRICS is far from ‘passive’ and ‘limited’ – precisely the words used by the European Parliament a few years ago to describe the grouping’s first real steps on the international arena. It is equally apparent that those states traditionally considered as strangers to the ‘Western order’ now possess both the necessary collective political will and practical capabilities to have the ‘bigger say’ and act as chief determinants of their own present and future. This is the only way to escape what they believe is an unjust and uncompromising international system. The extent to which this translates into reality, however, remains to be seen. 
Many analysts use the phrase ‘unipolar moment’ to describe America’s dominance from the late 1990s onwards, widely regarded as the leader of the ‘free’ world. However, BRICS and the now regular questioning of the West’s legitimacy when it comes to structuring and presiding over the international system indicates that the West’s own ‘unipolar moment’ is over. What was once merely a cooperation platform that allowed its members to meet on a regular basis has transformed into a deeper bloc that is now a symbolic and practical representation of a widespread disapproval of the ‘West-led’ international system. 
Going forward, we should expect BRICS+ to continue developing on the basis of the momentum that had been generated before Kazan and was recently reinforced in the Russian city. The West’s response to this now unignorable force will determine whether this sentiment is shared by its leaders. Present-day hostilities, with war in almost every continent, requires a profound assessment of just how the international community managed to arrive at such a perilous moment. Whether to combat structural deficiencies or redefine modern-day diplomacy and conflict management, it is time to get serious. This expanded version of the BRICS might just be the wake-up call those “in charge” of the international system so desperately need. 
 
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Summary. This piece analyses the emergence of alternative alliances, assessing a shift away from the dominance of Western institutions towards the formation of new ‘alternative’ alliance blocs. It uses the example of BRICS+ to assess the reasons behind this shift, analysing the origin of a profound ‘discontent’ of an increasingly large number of countries with the ‘Western way’ of conducting international relations. It also assesses the outcomes of the summit in Kazan and its potential implications for the future development of this ‘grouping’. 
 
   
Резюме. В этой статье анализируется возникновение альтернативных альянсов, дается оценка отхода от доминирования западных институтов в сторону формирования новых "альтернативных" альянсовых блоков. В нем на примере БРИКС+ оцениваются причины этого сдвига, анализируются причины глубокого "недовольства" все большего числа стран "западным способом" ведения международных отношений. В нем также дается оценка итогов саммита в Казани и его потенциальных последствий для будущего развития этой ‘группировки’.