Very few political events attract as much international attention, debate, and polarization in their coverage as the American presidential elections. Even though opinions on the role of the United States in the international community and the strength of its general influence often differ among analysts, the foreign policy trajectory pursued by the American president remains the most influential catalyst for the unfolding of events in international affairs. It is precisely for this reason why the November election, regardless of who eventually contests it and wins, is another historic opportunity for the US to either consolidate or redefine the course of its foreign policy and global outlook. The current international system is characterized by significant hostility, with more than just one armed conflict threatening to escalate into something more dangerous for international peace. The gravity of this situation is arguably reinforced most forcefully by the fact that the current system, with multilateralism and nuclear deterrence at the core, had been designed following the Second World War to prevent a scenario like the one observed today from being a possibility. 
Although the war in Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas tends to dominate global media headlines, relations between the ‘West’ (primarily the US) and Iran play a sometimes understated but highly significant role in shaping the current international security landscape. The ‘Iranian’ issue continues to form a significant part of America’s Middle Eastern policy, often considered a crucial element when it comes to defining the legacies of American presidents and their international outlooks. This can be seen most vividly with President Trump, with pulling the United States out of the ‘Iran deal’ in 2018 widely recognized as one of his first foreign policy acts as president. As Iran recently elected a new president following the sudden death of President Raisi, it will simultaneously be keeping a close eye on Washington and the extent to which the pre-election period, likely to be dominated by Trump’s ongoing legal cases, might offer an insight into future American policy towards the country and the region. 
The roots of the hostility
In the eyes of many Western policy experts and high-profile politicians, ‘dealing’ with Iran has and will remain a key foreign policy priority. For several decades, the state has been unequivocally characterized as one that is ‘hostile’ to Western nations and institutions. This portrayal originated several decades ago, with the first set of sanctions introduced by the West against Iran in 1972, followed by a more targeted package in 1992. The country’s relationship with Western powers has always been viewed through the prism of geopolitical competition. This involves issues like the highly complex matter of nuclear deterrence, confrontation over the global oil markets and the general perception of Iran in the West as a power that inherently ‘misaligns’ with its view of the world and international affairs. 
In addition to being seen as an actor that contradicts the key principles upon which the ‘Western’ system is based, Iran is treated by many with equally extreme caution in the foreign policy sphere. This is often linked with the country’s extensive power and influence in the Middle East, with multiple military groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas reliant on Iranian backing. The depth of this support is reflected by the fact that Iran’s relationship with these groups is categorized by the informal ‘axis of resistance’, designed to push back against Western cynicism and ‘imperialist’ motivations in the Middle East. Crucially, however, it is Iran’s nuclear programme and the decade long attempt by the West to manage and constrain its development that has most influenced the state of the country’s relationship with the rest of the world. Arguably, it was Donald Trump’s time in office that seemed to most intensely de-stabilize a complex relationship suffering from an already highly dangerous level of unpredictability and mistrust. 
The Iran deal and its immediate future 
The Iran Nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was an agreement signed in 2015 between Iran and various other powers, including the United States. The agreement was designed to provide considerable sanction relief to Iran in return for Tehran significantly scaling back its nuclear programme. Despite the deal initially being seen as an essential step to advancing nuclear non-proliferation and preventing Iran from developing into a hostile nuclear power, the decision by President Trump in 2018 to withdraw the United States from the agreement on the basis of it being a counterproductive for American geopolitical interests served to reignite already deep-rooted tensions. Even though President Biden vowed to re-join the Deal upon his arrival in office, the United States is yet to do so. This is the clearest indication that the positions of the sides on the most important issue surrounding the broader relationship, that of Iran’s approach to nuclear proliferation, do not converge. 
November’s presidential elections, should Donald Trump emerge victorious, have the potential to cause a major development in American Iranian relations. Throughout the Biden Administration’s tenure, partly due to several unprecedented and unforeseen international events such as the global pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the Iran deal was rarely at the forefront of foreign policy discussions. Although Biden was clear in his intentions to re-join the deal at ‘some point’, this has not materialized and is a process that is likely to be derailed even further should Trump return to the White House. The former president considers Iran an existential threat to American national security, never hesitating to take military action and retaliate whilst in office. The assassination of Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was one of several major escalations that occurred in the aftermath of America’s withdrawal from the deal, with the drone strikes labelled as a strategic and retaliatory measure to prevent Iran from carrying out further attacks on American personnel in the region. Trump’s belief that Iranian foreign policy is the most significant barrier to the prospect of peace in the Middle East is further highlighted by the signing of the Abraham Accords, agreements on the ‘normalization’ of relations between Israel and a number of Arab states including the UAE primarily through the mutual recognition of sovereignty. 
In parallel to the withdrawal from the ‘Iran deal’, the Trump administration initiated a campaign of ‘maximum pressure’ on Tehran which had been designed to ‘punish’ the country’s leadership for supposedly failing to comply with the terms of the JCPOA. Moreover, the Administration proceeded to label the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), essentially the country’s principal military organisation, as a terrorist one. Suddenly, it felt like what was a promising agreement designed to overcome a major international security threat had failed to survive into the next decade. The arrival of President Biden had, in theory, signalled to positive change with the President heavily critical of Trump’s decision to withdraw. However, through Biden’s first term, it never truly felt like the Iran deal was a foreign policy ‘priority’. As mentioned, the instability that followed on from the global pandemic and the beginning of the Ukraine war, in addition to challenge of balancing the deep-rooted partnership with Israel and conciliation with Iran, all prevented the Iran deal from being at the forefront of political conversations in Washington. The relationship continues to be shaped by fluctuating levels of tension and détente, with numerous instances of either strengthened sanctions or acts of political goodwill such as the exchange of prisoners and the unfreezing of Iranian revenues affected by decades of sanctions.    
Iranian and American elections – will the electorate have a major say? 
The election of reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as Iran’s next president, following the untimely death of President Raisi, provides interesting room for thought with regards to the future development of US-Iran relations. Pezeshkian, 69 years old, has a career full of public service, having previously run for president twice and also served as the Minister of Health. He has represented the Tabriz, Osku and Azarshahr electoral districts and served as the Iranian parliament’s Deputy Speaker from 2016 to 2020. In principle, the more centrist candidate is expected to be more tolerant towards the idea of working closer with the West and stopping the further isolation of Tehran from the international community. The vote for a more centrist and ‘socially liberal’ candidate may indicate a willingness among the Iranian population to pursue an agenda of change in both domestic affairs and the foreign policy domain. Nevertheless, given the highly complex nature of the Iranian political system and, ultimately, the role of the Supreme Leader, it is almost certain that major decisions on foreign affairs will remain outside Pezeshkian’s list of responsibilities. Therefore, even if there might be appetite among voters for reform and potential realignment with the West, the extent to which this will be possible remains extremely uncertain. Moreover, given the recent escalation between Iran and Israel and the on-going hostility over Gaza and the broader Middle Eastern security landscape, there is little a newly elected president in a system like Iran’s can do to radically change the geopolitical reality on the ground. Although Pezeshkian is naturally more willing to engage in negotiations with American leadership and radically differs in this to his hard-line alternative Saeed Jalili, a lot will depend on the way the US approaches the Iranian nuclear challenge and whether this approach will be deemed satisfactory enough by the Iranian side. 
Elsewhere, US presidential elections represent another potential array of opportunities for the future unfolding of Iran’s relationship with the West. The Iranian political class is certain that in the case of a Trump victory, relations will continue to be marked by mutual distrust. Nevertheless, there is no particular sense of optimism surrounding the prospect of a second Biden term. The current president, despite voicing support for the deal, is in no way as passionate of an advocate of the deal as his Democratic predecessor, Barack Obama. Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that the current situation in Gaza would have been avoided if he had been president, often pointing the blame exclusively at Tehran and its role in establishing and diffusing the 'axis of resistance’ of which, crucially, Hamas is a part of. His now famous categorisation of his enemies and opponents as “bad guys” or “bad people” is likely to be applied to the likes of Iran more forcefully as ever before, should he return as president. This, rightly so, places in question the extent to which an individual president or administration can, in the present regional environment, considerably influence the course of the relationship. The presence of armed confrontation, of which Iran, albeit indirectly, is an integral part, and the potential for further escalation, has undoubtedly overshadowed diplomatic efforts to manage and alleviate what is a deep-rooted and multi-faceted hostility. 
Most recently, it was announced that James David Vance, an American senator from Ohio, was chosen as Donald Trump’s ‘running mate’ (Vice-President) for the upcoming election. Vance’s international outlook, and more specifically his derogatory remarks about Islam and its role in international affairs will only further exacerbate a strained relationship between Trump and the Iranian political class. Vance has followed Trump in classifying the Iran Deal as a ’disaster’, describing Israel as America’s closest ally and labelling several countries, including Iran, as ‘Islamist’ countries. Along with criticising the Western effort to uphold Ukraine’s war effort, Vance is unlikely to be willing to compromise on issues politicians like him tend to label as being counter to American self-interest. 
Broader lessons for the global order
There is profound concern in the West that an increasing number of states, historically open in their rejection of a ‘Western-oriented’ international system, are leaning towards more fragmented cooperation in different alliance blocs. This undoubtedly includes Iran, who in addition to being a powerful player in the Middle East that prioritises countering Israeli influence is also consistently developing closer ties with powers like Russia. Hence, there are genuine concerns about the establishment of an alternative global alliance that seeks to counteract Western influence and instead formulate a common approach to cooperation that prioritises the immediate interests of those states and those of their respective regions. Many in the West are appreciative of this dynamic and have in fact resorted to self-criticism when recognizing the inability of relevant institutions to consolidate and sustain the diffusion of a rules based international order they believe should serve as the guiding principle for all nations. The European Union, for example, has not yet succeeded in its pledge of becoming a powerful force in security and defence. In this case, internal disputes, and the inability to reach consensus on key policy areas tend to further undermine the trust of many in the power of European and Western institutions to act as global leaders. This is further exacerbated by the emergence of far-right nationalism in various European capitals, something several Western leaders appear determined to confront immediately. Nevertheless, despite the consistent framing of the likes of Iran, Russia, and China as ‘them’ in the ‘us versus them’ dichotomy, it appears the spread and consolidation of such ‘alternative alliances’ is now inevitable as they openly deepen and institutionalize their cooperation whilst criticising the ‘West’ and its international conduct. 
What should be expected? 
Despite its divisive nature, with many questioning its utility in the first place, the Iran deal did achieve a level of ‘restraint’ in US-Iran relations. However, the deal did not succeed in removing the inherent sense of distrust between the sides. Moreover, Iran’s position within the Middle East’s dynamic and its relationship with other key actors is an additional element to consider. The escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the unprecedented exchange of strikes between Iran and Israel in April 2024 demonstrates that the sides are certainly not headed for peace and mutual co-existence. Given its status as the leader of the free world, a status that requires both practical and moral leadership, the US will be expected to play a fundamental role in keeping a tap on further armed escalation. However, it will almost certainly be the American electorate that will dictate in what capacity this role will be. Given the considerable weight of the challenge Iran poses, it will undoubtedly be among the leading foreign policy factors voters consider before deciding on the ‘next leader of the free world’. 

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  Summary. This piece analyses the recent dynamics in the relationship between the United States and Iran through the lens of both country’s presidential elections. Taking into consideration the historical dimension of the relationship, the piece considers the ways in which the potential return of Donald Trump could further damage an already hostile relationship and undermine international security.
Keywords: Iran nuclear deal, United States, international security, nuclear proliferation, presidential elections, Trump, Pezeshkian, sanctions, Middle East, Israel
 
Гусейн СУЛТАНЛЫ (Великобритания), 
[email protected]
 
ПРЕДСТОЯЩЕЕ ОБОСТРЕНИЕ ИРАНО-АМЕРИКАНСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЙ: МЕЖДУ ДАЛЬНЕЙШЕЙ ВРАЖДЕБНОСТЬЮ И ОСТОРОЖНОЙ СДЕРЖАННОСТЬЮ
 
Резюме. В этой статье анализируется недавняя динамика в отношениях между Соединенными Штатами и Ираном через призму президентских выборов в обеих странах. Принимая во внимание историческое измерение отношений, в статье рассматриваются способы, с помощью которых потенциальное возвращение Дональда Трампа может еще больше испортить и без того враждебные отношения и подорвать международную безопасность.
Ключевые слова: Ядерная сделка с Ираном, Соединенные Штаты, международная безопасность, распространение ядерного оружия, президентские выборы, Трамп, Пезешкиан, санкции, Ближний Восток, Израиль