Huseyn SULTANLI (Azerbaijan),

PhD student of the department of International relations and foreign policy of the 

Academy of Public Administration under the 

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FINAL OPPORTUNITY?

     The European Union’s (EU) strategic actorness is facing a unique and direct challenge. The second Trump administration issued a final yet decisive message to the international system – the United States was no longer going to operate as the ‘leader’ of a transatlantic alliance which it believes, for too long, was based on non- reciprocity and American over-extension. As the other highly influential actor in the relationship, the EU faced no other choice than to act. The on-going war in Ukraine was, since its beginning, portrayed in Brussels as a matter of ‘survival’ for European security, with member state support a ‘must’ as opposed to a ‘choice’. However, to this day, the EU remains divided on the matter and has been unable to influence events on the ground in a sufficiently meaningful way. This analysis will propose that, in addition to the policy deviation pursued by members like Hungary and Slovakia, it is in fact the division at the heart of the EU (among key founders and drivers of the project) that has been as influential in weakening its strategic actorness. The analysis will argue that if members are to unite over a consistent, norms-based, and future oriented foreign policy strategy, the Weimar Triangle (composed of Germany, France and Poland) must return as the starting point.

The Weimar Triangle: the background

   The Weimar triangle, established in 1991 after the meeting of the German, French and Polish Foreign Ministers in the German city of Weimar, was aimed at providing the three countries with a platform to establish mutually beneficial cooperation and overcome historic barriers. The format worked at helping Poland integrate into the European alliance, taking the Franco-German model of post-war reconciliation as an example. The three countries were keen on building a “special relationship” at the highest level, also including each other’s parliaments and civil societies. The format was a key catalyst in helping Poland join NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004. Although the essence of the format was always the development of a shared vision for Europe, disagreements between leaders have led to fluctuating levels of engagement through this framework. Therefore, despite its overarching significance, it is not a format that is immune to diplomatic divergence. This has frequently limited the EU’s internal unity, something which necessitates a much closer assessment.

Defence and security: a definitive shift

   From the outside, the EU might appear as a leading example of regional integration, where solidarity and mutual understanding are key operational principles. After all, the EU is the world’s largest single market. However, the reality from within is radically different. Despite the considerable authority and decision-making power of its core institutions (most notably the European Commission), the EU remains largely under the control of its member states and their (in)ability to converge on essential matters. In more than one instance, this has led to contradictory and self-harming policies that have presented the much broader organization as a politically motivated entity that does not adhere to a common idea, of which, in theory, values like equality and justice should be a key part.

   The war in Ukraine, however, has proven to be a decisive challenge for the Union’s way of ‘thinking’ about matters of shared importance like defence and security. In previous periods, the EU appeared determined to maintain its ‘normative’ or ‘soft’ power status. This, on paper, was described as relying on diplomatic and normative power tools to uphold international law and subsequently international security.

   However, the securitization of the European continent since February 2022 and specifically the fear that Russia might go even further into Europe have forced European allies to re-think their approach. This is already underway, with the EU having adopted numerous individual projects but also broader future-oriented policy frameworks. For example, ‘Rearm Europe’, announced in March 2025, pledges to mobilise €800 billion for defence investment by providing member states with financial levers at their immediate disposal. More precise and self-critical assessments such as the European Defence White Paper, titled “Readiness 2030”, have announced initiatives such as the “Strategic dialogue” with the defence industry which will aim to increase ‘military mobility’ – essentially enabling member states to move troops and equipment around the continent and across each other’s borders in the case of intensified “conflict” or “hybrid warfare”. This signals, at least in rhetoric, a definitive shift. The EU, led by the European Commission, has transitioned its approach to defence from one of sporadic investment to a full-scale readiness programme that is determined to finally establish agency on the battlefields.

   It is precisely this stage of pledges and plans materializing into real action that has historically proven to be the most difficult hurdle for the EU to overcome. First, there are competing positions on whether the EU should be ‘exchanging’ its normative or soft power status for a security turn which does not fit naturally with its foundational identity. This is illustrated by historic but also newly-emerging divisions between member states which tend to unite in groupings on two clear sides of the spectrum – to invest significantly and break uncomfortable stereotypes or maintain pragmatism and show restraint in an increasingly hostile international system whilst relying on external (American) security guarantees. The latter position is one that has faced increasing scrutiny, with the Trump Administration choosing to exclude the EU from its diplomatic initiatives and preferring to work in solitary. Second, there is a deep- rooted unease with the prospect of ‘delegating’ too much responsibility over defence and security spending to the European Commission, which some fear would lead to ‘over-centralization’.

   However, there is limited consensus on what an alternative leadership ‘group’ or ‘arrangement’ would look like – would this be the “Weimar Triangle”, the “Weimar Triangle +” or a different set up? This aspect points to the heart of the issue – internally, the EU’s members are simply too fragmented and disjointed to be acting coherently in a sphere as complex as defence. This tends to translate into limited strategic relevance in almost all of its foreign policy endeavours. One additional but vital example is the South Caucasus, where the EU’s role over the years has slipped into being an unproductive one given the desire of members like France to support Armenia in ways that directly undermine Azerbaijani national interests but also the broader region’s security. This behaviour is not mirrored by others in the Union, with countries like Hungary blocking EU military aid to Armenia given its implications for a country as important to the EU’s geopolitical goals as Azerbaijan.

    Even when something is agreed upon, this usually comes at the expense of months of compromising, negotiations and even change in political leadership which facilitates the said agreement. The urgency of fixing this structural limitation is in fact reflected by key European leaders. One of the first statements of the recently elected German Chancellor Friedrich Merz on the transatlantic alliance highlighted that the US will not be allowed to negotiate on trade bilaterally with specific member states. Instead, this has to be done on a collective and institutional level to ensure that member states prioritize uniting over a highly fragmented regional agenda. Even though disparity in controversial aspects such as spending commitments is inevitable, there is finally recognition in Brussels that member states have no choice but to work in solidarity if they are to survive the major reconfiguration currently taking place in the transatlantic alliance.

The EU’s ‘leverage’ issue

    The on-going attempt at mediation between Russia and Ukraine is the most recent but revealing reminder of the EU’s troubled international role. Despite its heavy sanctions programme against Russia and consistent support for Ukraine, it is still the United States that has the upper hand when it comes to directly influencing the sides of the conflict and the course of events on the diplomatic level. President Trump did not support the ceasefire deadline of 12 May that was put forward by a group of influential European leaders, instead indirectly siding with President Putin’s wish to negotiate (in Istanbul on May 15) before any ceasefire agreement is announced. This is a strong indication that despite the EU’s self-proclaimed leadership and its support for Ukraine, its ability to directly influence Russia is extremely limited. In fact, only recently it was announced that in 2024 the EU spent 22 billion euros on imports of Russian oil and gas, which is more than the money it sent to Ukraine. Even though the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas pointed out that this is exacerbated by a misbalance in the consumption of Russian resources between member states, with some not buying from Russia at all and some buying disproportionately, it is still a statistic that speaks of the EU’s limited leverage over Russia.

   Issues with the EU’s leverage vis-à-vis Ukraine are exacerbated further by the current state of the transatlantic relationship, where collective confidence in NATO appears to be declining and the US has doubled down on isolated cooperation in accordance with its own interests. Donald Trump has for several years insisted that “Europe”, by which he indirectly addresses its most influential powers, has failed to contribute its fair share to mutual defence. In fact, only recently, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte pointed out that, as of today, in three months Russia can produce three times as many weapons as NATO members can produce in one full year. Although the collective defence spending of EU member states rose from €218 billion in 2021 to €326 billion in 2024, it is a widely accepted fact that bigger increases will be needed which will, crucially, need to be more evenly spread between member states. This is supported by NATO Secretary General warning members that the minimum 2% commitment will soon have to be elevated to more than 3% of GDP, signalling a much broader intensification in defence spending.

   Hence, on a political level, the EU faces the unprecedented challenge of balancing between its own geopolitical objectives whilst preserving the essence of the now weakened transatlantic alliance. Recently, Donald Trump doubled down on his criticism of the EU, both from the perspective of existing contributions but also in terms of ‘negotiating capacity’, stating that negotiations with the EU are “harder” to deal with than those with China. This is a dangerous situation for the EU, with strained relations with Washington threatening to even further undermine its leverage over Russia. European leaders might be pursuing their independent mediation channels, but this too has had limited impact on the situation. The insistence of both the American and Russian presidents on their private face to face talks as the only ‘key’ to a resolution confirms that they simply do not view the Brussels system and its member states as influential actors in the overarching process. Despite countless sanctions, the EU has been unable to weaken the Russian economy sufficiently enough for the Kremlin to treat the ‘coalition of the willing’ as an equal or relevant enough party in the mediation process.

“Peace through strength” – and unity?

   Fragmentation among the EU27 is well-documented. There is a profound and shared sense of disillusionment with the European project in member states like Hungary, Slovakia and even Romania. This stems from the feeling that the European Union is a project that has been ‘hijacked’ by a very specific agenda that is contradictory, based on the wrong principles and imposes moral and normative expectations on member states with which they simply do not align. This is a situation that has damaged the EU’s international legitimacy – instead of appearing as a united and exemplary model of integration, it appears fragmented from within and, crucially, deemed inoperable by the international community during crises and other critical situations.

   Nevertheless, the Brussels system has always been effective at presenting unity amidst chaos and division. Its official documentation on upcoming defence and security pledges, including the Readiness 2030 White Paper, always uses unifying and positive language. The reality, however, as shown by recent efforts in Ukraine, is radically different. In addition to divisions between Brussels and the likes of Hungary on the Union’s Russia policy, there is also an alarming lack of adequate coordination between leading member states. Only recently, it was reported that President Macron of France and Prime Minister Meloni of Italy were involved in a “diplomatic row” over the latter’s exclusion from a quartet of European leaders which had been in direct contact with the White House throughout the Istanbul negotiations between Russian and Ukrainian delegations. According to Meloni, this was done because Italy had made it clear that it would not be willing to send troops to Ukraine to safeguard a potential ceasefire agreement. German Chancellor Merz had to intervene and use his joint press conference with Meloni to reiterate the importance of ‘unity’ whereas Meloni herself urged leaders to “abandon egotism”. This is one of several such episodes, with the Italian Prime Minister also sharing a complicated relationship with the previous German Chancellor Olaf Scholz due to disagreements on migration policy.

   Nevertheless, ever since the US announced its unwillingness to work with the EU on mediation in Ukraine, the Weimar triangle has undoubtedly gained new momentum. Germany, France and Poland have consistently merged their contacts with Ukraine and the Trump administration, expanding the format to include the United Kingdom and, on occasion, Italy. Some have characterized the new, slightly extended format as “Weimar+”, indicating that there is appetite for renewed cooperation that builds on previous formats. In fact, in recent months, a series of bilateral defence and security deals or pacts have been announced. For example, Poland and France upgraded their security ties to establish mutual guarantees and promise each other support in time of armed conflict. The UK and the EU have also followed suit, announcing a new defence and security pact which will ensure that officials from both sides meet once every six months to directly discuss progress, with the UK also agreeing to officially join the EU’s defence mobility scheme PESCO. Elsewhere, there is hope that Franco- German relations, considered to be the engine of European integration, will be revitalized after Friedrich Merz replaced Olaf Scholz, who struggled to find common language with President Macron.

   The newly appointed European Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius recently emphasized the importance of pursuing peace “through strength”. Although only time will be the judge of whether effective or not, the EU has undoubtedly turned a corner on the scale of its commitments. It is mobilizing as many resources as ever before and using language as ambitious as ever before. However, in the same way that peace can only be achieved through strength, it also demands unity. The European Commission might be influential in its own right and might possess a new look after last year’s parliamentary elections, but a significant degree of collective decision-making still relies on the ability of member states to converge on fundamental issues. In the Ukraine case, this concerns the magnitude of military aid being sent to Ukraine and the management of the relationship with Russia.

    Essentially, if the EU wants to finally “talk tough” to its strategic rivals and avoid being sidelined in defining moments, it must invest considerably not only in its defence capabilities but also in its internal harmony.

    If the EU desires to gain leverage in complex international negotiations, these are certainly positive steps. The unpredictability that surrounds Donald Trump’s mediation between Ukraine and Russia should serve as a constant warning for the EU. In case the American president becomes increasingly agitated with the lack of progress, the EU could be left on its own in a fight it is simply unprepared for.

    Following his most recent conversation with President Putin, it was reported that Trump informed EU leaders that the US will try not to impose sanctions on Russia as it wishes to exhaust the negotiations track. This will significantly weaken the weight of any future EU sanctions package, especially given their already questionable impact on the Russian economy. It is for such scenarios that European powers must prepare themselves. For an organization that is already on strained terms with some of its members, restoring order and harmony within its nucleus is a vital first step for developing agency in shaping European, and then, international security.

Conclusion

    The European Union, despite the long list of challenges it faces, maintains considerable influence around the world. However, there is broad consensus that its international legitimacy, defined by scholars as the ‘conferred right’ to act on behalf of others, is limited and has never made the definitive transition to ‘strategic actor’ status. The issues and divisions discussed might have been acceptable or not deemed as defining in previous periods of international affairs. In the aftermath of the Second World War, states agreed that economic cooperation was the priority, and the EU was very much a leader in this regard. This continued throughout the Cold War. Although the EU did begin to devote more attention to its security following the 9/11 attacks and the 2003 Iraq War, it very much relied on Washington’s security guarantees during the ‘American Unipolar moment’.

    The ‘relatively’ recent emergence of alternative centers of power, however, has forced the EU into a definite strategic re-calculation. There is a realization that in the current international climate of hostility, the persistent weakening of international legal mechanisms and recalibration of American foreign policy, the EU needs to possess a lot more than just economic coercive power. It must prove that it can unite its member states on the most crucial issues, restore a sense of inclusivity to prevent key states feeling isolated and disregarded, and must finally materialize its defence and security ambitions into practicable steps. All of these points cannot be achieved simultaneously and in their entirety. However, the EU has to start somewhere if it wishes to survive the shift from one international order to another, with the latter demanding precisely the things the EU appears to be lacking: unity, actorness, personality, and legitimacy. This, however, has to come from within, which is why any change must begin with the now revitalized Weimar triangle. If one was to take the title of the most recent European Political Community Summit in Albania (“a new Europe in a new world”) at face value, then policymakers in Brussels appear to have accepted the urgency of the challenge they face.

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Huseyn SULTANLI (Azerbaijan),

PhD student of the department of International relations and foreign policy of the 

Academy of Public Administration under the 

President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

THE WEIMAR TRIANGLE AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FINAL OPPORTUNITY?

Summary. This analysis explores a key factor undermining the European Union’s geopolitical relevance, highlighting internal fragmentation as the key obstacle preventing the EU from achieving strategic actorness in international relations. The article suggests that the revitalization of the historic Weimar triangle format (Germany, France, Poland) presents EU leadership with a unique but decisive opportunity. As the United States becomes more transactional in its foreign policy engagements, the EU must find a way to reach internal consensus on matters of vital importance for European security. Focusing on the recent negotiations on Ukraine as one of the examples, the article argues that if the EU is to survive the current transition to a new international order, it must direct urgent attention to building its actorness and legitimacy through renewing and even extending formats like the Weimar triangle.

Гусейн СУЛТАНЛЫ (Азербайджан),

докторант кафедры Международных отношений и внешней политики 

Академии Государственного Управления 

при Президенте Азербайджанской Республики

ВЕЙМАРСКИЙ ТРЕУГОЛЬНИК И ГЛОБАЛЬНОЕ ЛИДЕРСТВО: ПОСЛЕДНИЙ ВАРИАНТ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СОЮЗА?

Резюме. В данной работе рассматривается ключевой фактор, подрывающий геополитическую значимость Европейского Союза, и внутренняя раздробленность выделяется как главное аспект, препятствующий ЕС в достижении стратегической активности в международных отношениях. В статье предполагается, что возрождение исторического формата Веймарского треугольника (Германия, Франция, Польша) предоставляет руководству ЕС уникальную, но решающую возможность. По мере того, как Соединенные Штаты становятся все более транзакционными в своих внешнеполитических обязательствах, ЕС должен найти способ достичь внутреннего консенсуса по вопросам, жизненно важным для европейской безопасности. Сосредоточившись на недавних переговорах по Украине как на одном из примеров, в статье утверждается, что, если ЕС хочет пережить нынешний переход к новому международному порядку, он должен срочно сосредоточить внимание на укреплении своей активности и легитимности путем обновления и даже расширения таких форматов, как Веймарский треугольник.