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ИНСТИТУТ ЮРИДИЧЕСКИХ И ПОЛИТИЧЕСКИХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ
АКАДЕМИИ НАУК МОЛДОВЫ
ГЕЛАТСКАЯ АКАДЕМИЯ НАУК (ГРУЗИЯ)
ВЫСШАЯ ШКОЛА ПО БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ЭКОНОМИКИ (БОЛГАРИЯ)
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ ЦЕНТР ПОЛИТИКО-ПРАВОВЫХ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЙ
ПРАВО И ПОЛИТОЛОГИЯ / страница:
Mehman SULEYMANOV (Azerbaijan),
Professor of the Military Research Institute
of the National Defense University
MILITARY-POLITICAL PROVOCATIONS OF ARMENIA AGAINST AZERBAIJAN ON THE EVE OF THE PATRIOTIC WAR
The Continuation of Aggressive Policies by Armenia’s New Leadership
In May 1994, the ceasefire along the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces created an opportunity for a peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Armenia’s leadership did not abandon its nationalist-expansionist policy, and substantive progress was not achieved. High-level meetings and Minsk Group–mediated negotiations produced no change. The Armenian side refused to return the occupied Azerbaijani districts; instead, it proclaimed the creation of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and incorporated seven surrounding occupied districts into this entity. Armenian nationalist circles changed the names of Azerbaijani settlements located outside the former autonomous oblast and began building multilayered defensive systems there. Officials of the self-proclaimed entity even argued that returning those districts would violate its constitution, insisting that Azerbaijan recognize the borders of the de-facto republic (including the occupied districts) and agree to their legalization [1, 198].
The 2018 Velvet Revolution in Armenia and Nikol Pashinyan’s appointment as prime minister briefly raised hopes for renewed momentum in peace efforts. Those hopes proved unfounded. Shortly after becoming prime minister on 8 May 2018, Pashinyan visited Khankendi on 9 May and took part in events commemorating the capture of Shusha. In his speeches he called for a change in the negotiation format to include representatives of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh authorities as parties to the talks. In the following months he repeatedly maintained that the only solution was direct discussions between Azerbaijan’s leadership and the de-facto authorities and suggested Armenia was prepared to make concessions that, in practice, amounted to recognition and legalization of the occupation. At the same time, Pashinyan warned that, should a settlement not meet Armenian interests, Armenia was prepared for a military resolution; after consultations with the army and the de-facto leadership he even sent explicit warnings to Azerbaijan, claiming that Armenia’s armed forces and the so-called defense forces were keeping the situation firmly under control [2, 3, 4].
In 2018, during the CIS summit in Dushanbe, an informal meeting took place between President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. According to Armenian media, the discussion focused on reducing tensions along the line of contact and establishing direct communication between the two countries’ defense ministries. Later, it became known that Pashinyan had asked President Aliyev for time to stabilize the domestic situation, prevent the return of the former authorities, maintain the ceasefire, and prepare Armenian society for peace. In essence, Armenia’s new leadership requested a period of calm before attempting any progress in the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Azerbaijan reacted constructively, hoping the negotiation process might soon take a more substantive form. As Armenian experts also noted, signs of stabilization at the line of contact began to appear. Direct communication between Baku and Yerevan was established, and interest in reviving public diplomacy increased. For the first time in many years, Azerbaijani and Armenian journalists conducted mutual visits. However, these positive tendencies quickly faded. After his victory in the December 2018 parliamentary elections, Pashinyan strengthened his domestic position and instructed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to revise the content of the negotiation process. This significantly complicated talks, which had previously been based on the Madrid Principles—accepted by mediators and providing for the phased return of the occupied Azerbaijani territories.
Following the elections, Armenia openly declared it would no longer negotiate on the basis of earlier agreements. Pashinyan effectively abandoned issues previously discussed under former Armenian governments and introduced ambiguity into the negotiation framework. His administration sought to redefine the status of the occupied territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, claiming they constituted a “security zone.” Thus, the new Armenian leadership refrained from taking any steps toward a settlement consistent with international law, including UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as well as decisions of the OIC, NAM, and the European Parliament.
Mediation proposals aimed at resolving the conflict were categorically rejected by Armenia’s new leadership. Some Armenian experts criticized this approach, yet Pashinyan’s government insisted that the security of the Armenian population of Karabakh could only be ensured through recognition of the so-called entity’s independence. They argued that without such recognition, no discussion of returning the territories forming the “security zone” was possible. During talks with mediators, Armenian officials distanced themselves from all previously reached understandings and introduced new demands aimed at legitimizing the occupation—demands that even Armenia’s traditional supporters among mediators did not accept. Mediators openly warned that if Armenia refused to abandon these new positions and rejected compromise, renewed war could become inevitable.
Armenian diplomats later acknowledged that Pashinyan was confident in his new strategy and did not believe mediators would allow Azerbaijan to resort to war. At the same time, Armenian officials continued to issue threats, declaring that while Armenia did not desire war, it would not tolerate pressure and was prepared for military confrontation [5, 6, 7].
On 29 March 2019, the first official meeting between President Ilham Aliyev and Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, with the participation of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, was held in Vienna. The expectation was that the discussions would help steer Pashinyan away from his recently advanced unfounded demands and revive the stalled negotiation process. However, confident that he would face no international pressure, Pashinyan again insisted on changing the negotiation format and involving representatives of the illegal entity established in the occupied Azerbaijani territories. He argued that previous Armenian leaders, being from Nagorno-Karabakh, represented the interests of the separatist structure, whereas he, born in Armenia, could not speak on its behalf. The Azerbaijani leadership rejected this position unequivocally, as it was intended to artificially prolong negotiations, disguise Armenia’s occupation policy, and portray Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity as an internal dispute. In reality, Pashinyan’s stance once again demonstrated his refusal to consider the liberation of the occupied territories. By early 2019, this approach had already become official policy, reflected also in a statement by the Secretary of Armenia’s Security Council in February that not “an inch of land” would be returned.
Armenia’s Minister of Defence soon issued an even more aggressive statement, openly displaying Yerevan’s expansionist intentions. On 30 March 2019—one day after the Vienna meeting—Defence Minister David Tonoyan declared before representatives of the Armenian diaspora in the United States that Armenia not only would not return the occupied territories but could seize new ones. He introduced the doctrine “new war – new territories” and outlined strategic plans to implement it. Tonoyan dismissed the concept of “land for peace” as outdated, arguing that returning five or seven districts under the Madrid Principles would dismantle the engineering-fortification system of “Artsakh” and weaken Armenian military capacity. He stated that the Armenian army must transform from a trench-based defensive force into an offensive one, capable of shifting combat operations deep into “enemy territory.” Tonoyan even threatened that Armenian forces could advance beyond the former boundaries of the separatist entity up to the Kura River, take control of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas pipelines, and seize other critical infrastructure. He warned that a new war would result in Azerbaijan losing additional territories and facing a massive influx of displaced persons, thereby weakening the Azerbaijani government.
In response to these territorial claims, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a special statement on 1 April 2019, describing Tonoyan’s remarks as provocations that undermined efforts to resolve the conflict. The statement emphasized that the Azerbaijani Armed Forces rank among the strongest in the world and could liberate the occupied territories in a short time. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan harbours no territorial claims against other states and demands only the restoration of its internationally recognized borders, as required by UN Security Council resolutions. The Ministry also underscored that, should peaceful means fail, Azerbaijan was prepared—within the norms of international law—to free its lands from occupation militarily.
Shortly after his remarks in the United States, Tonoyan visited a location near the Armenian border with Azerbaijan’s Gadabay district on 13 April 2019, openly observing the area of the former Başkənd settlement and reaffirming Armenia’s new territorial ambitions. This once again demonstrated that Yerevan’s claims to additional Azerbaijani territories were not rhetorical.
Armenia’s unconstructive and destructive position regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement was not supported by international mediators. On 21 April 2019, speaking at a public event, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov described Yerevan’s approach as unacceptable. He recalled that the four UN Security Council resolutions unequivocally affirm Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and call for a peaceful settlement. According to Lavrov, negotiations based on these principles had continued for many years, resulting in the Madrid Principles and the Kazan Document, which envisage the phased withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories, the opening of communication lines, the lifting of blockades, and other confidence-building measures [11].
Armenia’s Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan immediately reacted to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s statement, firmly declaring that territorial concessions to Azerbaijan in the process of settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were unacceptable. He stressed that the territories mentioned by Lavrov constituted not only a “security zone” but also the main defensive lines, adding that no Armenian side could even imagine endangering the security of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh by returning these lands.
Following this, Armenia’s Foreign Ministry contacted the Russian MFA and demanded an end to discussions about a phased settlement. Yerevan warned that otherwise it would officially declare its refusal to participate in any talks based on a step-by-step approach.
On 5 August 2019, during the opening ceremony of the Pan-Armenian Games in Khankendi, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan once again confirmed Armenia’s occupation policy, proclaiming: “Artsakh is Armenia, period.” He added that only solutions approved by the peoples of Armenia and Karabakh could be considered acceptable. For Armenia and the separatist regime, this meant the permanent consolidation of the occupation of Azerbaijani lands. By calling Nagorno-Karabakh a part of Armenia, Pashinyan effectively rejected any settlement within the framework of international law and relevant international resolutions.
Armenian experts also noted that Yerevan thereby signaled its intention to conduct negotiations solely on its own terms, otherwise refusing further talks.
President Ilham Aliyev assessed the consequences of Pashinyan’s statement for the negotiation process, emphasizing that after the phrase “Karabakh is Armenia,” the possibility of meaningful dialogue disappeared. According to him, despite appeals from the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs to show understanding toward the new Armenian leadership, Armenia openly stated that it would not return the occupied territories and rejected the principles previously developed by the Minsk Group. President Aliyev concluded that negotiations cannot be conducted unilaterally and that Azerbaijan currently has no real negotiating partner on the Armenian side.
Armenian Military Provocation in the Tovuz Direction
A few days before the July 2020 clashes on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border near Tovuz, Ruben Margaryan—who introduced himself as an adviser to the so-called “foreign minister” of the separatist regime—accused Azerbaijan of “occupying Armenian lands.” Speaking on behalf of the illegal entity, he laid claims to Ganja, Dashkasan, Gadabay, Shamkir, and Khanlar, describing their seizure as one of the main goals of the regime, in reality of Armenia. Referring to several UN documents in a distorted manner, he even argued that Azerbaijan was obliged to “return” these territories to the separatist structure.
Armenia’s new National Security Strategy, adopted in early July 2020, also openly reaffirmed its uncompromising occupation policy. Published first on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Facebook page under the title “National Goals of the Armenian People,” the document declared that “ensuring the security of Artsakh” and removing it from Azerbaijan must be among Armenia’s main national objectives. It further stated that Armenia’s “national interest” included achieving international recognition of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. According to the strategy, negotiations on the conflict should aim at the international acceptance of the “self-determination” claims of the separatist entity.
The document insisted that any decision would be acceptable only if approved by the populations of Armenia and the so-called Artsakh. It accused Azerbaijan of “blocking” the peace process and claimed that Baku’s right to restore its territorial integrity by force was unacceptable.
In June 2020, shortly before the strategy’s adoption, Onik Gasparyan—newly appointed Chief of the General Staff of Armenia’s Armed Forces—submitted a report calling for a large-scale pre-emptive attack against Azerbaijan. He demanded the destruction of Azerbaijani front-line personnel, military equipment, logistics and infrastructure in order to neutralize Azerbaijan’s defensive potential [23].
Thus, military provocation against Azerbaijan had effectively become Armenia’s official policy. Soon after, on 12 July 2020, Armenian forces launched a major attack on Azerbaijan’s Tovuz district—located far from the Karabakh region—using artillery against Azerbaijani positions. The clashes, which lasted until 17 July, resulted in 12 Azerbaijani servicemen becoming martyrs, and an elderly civilian was killed as villages came under fire. The provocation once again demonstrated Armenia’s refusal to abandon its aggressive stance; its goal was to create a new hotspot of tension, seize additional territories, and exert pressure on Azerbaijan in hopes of securing recognition of the illegal separatist entity.
On 21 August 2020, at a meeting of Armenia’s Security Council, Pashinyan again issued statements typical of his political rhetoric, presenting the July events as an Armenian “victory” and urging Azerbaijan to accept the “existing reality.” He claimed that the so-called “Artsakh people” had already put an end to the question of the conflict’s resolution and insisted that, if the issue were military, they had “already solved it.”
Yet after the 2020 Patriotic War, Pashinyan publicly acknowledged that Armenia should have made concessions following the July clashes, even writing: “That was the decisive moment; at that time we should have taken the decision to make unilateral concessions.” [22]
Provocative Statements by the Armenian Leadership
On 23 July 2020, Armenia’s prime minister rejected the OSCE Minsk Group’s Basic Principles for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and instead presented his own set of seven principles. Acceptance of these proposals would, in essence, have meant the continuation of Armenia’s occupation of Azerbaijani territories. Among them were demands to ensure the security of Armenia and the separatist regime, grant the illegal entity direct participation in negotiations, require Azerbaijan to renounce the use of force, force Baku into unlimited concessions, and remove the “security” of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic from the agenda. They also included creating an international mechanism to control the ceasefire.
President Ilham Aliyev strongly rejected these proposals, emphasizing their unacceptable nature. He noted that Armenia’s demand for Azerbaijan to negotiate directly with the so-called republic was impossible, as the entity had no legal status and was recognized by no one—not even by Armenia itself. President Aliyev stressed that such conditions were aimed at destroying the negotiation process and altering its format, which had always been between Azerbaijan and Armenia alone. He reiterated that the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied Azerbaijani territories was required by international law and UN Security Council resolutions, and that peace would be impossible without this withdrawal.
President Aliyev publicly reaffirmed that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity was not subject to negotiation, and the only valid proposal was the unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from all occupied regions of Azerbaijan.
Following Pashinyan’s statements, Arayik Harutyunyan - presented as “president” of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Republic - issued his own seven-point proposal. He demanded recognition of the separatist entity as a negotiation party, removal of its “security” from the discussion, recognition of the so-called people’s “right to self-determination,” and Azerbaijan’s renunciation of using force. He added that if Azerbaijan attempted to liberate its territories militarily, the illegal armed groups would transfer combat operations into Azerbaijani territory.
By late September 2020, Pashinyan again declared that, from Armenia’s perspective, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was already “resolved.” His government’s political course aimed to impose this narrative on both Azerbaijan and the international community. To reinforce this position, Armenia continued to provoke new military incidents along the line of contact.
The Last Armenian Provocations on the Eve of the Patriotic War
Following the Tovuz incidents, the military-political leadership of Armenia undertook further steps aimed at escalating the situation along the line of contact with Azerbaijan. In August 2020, Armenia dispatched a sabotage group to the front line. The commander of this group, detained by Azerbaijani servicemen, confessed that they had been sent to carry out attacks on civilians, commit acts of terror, and assault Azerbaijani military personnel. The President of the Republic of Azerbaijan assessed these actions as clear evidence of Armenia’s preparations for a new war against Azerbaijan. He emphasized that another indication of these preparations was Armenia’s announcement of its intention to form volunteer units numbering tens of thousands of people. The President rightly questioned: “If Armenia wants peace, as it sometimes claims, if they wish to continue negotiations, what is the need for such steps?” [21].
As President Ilham Aliyev stressed, Armenia’s objective was not only to provoke but also to undermine the negotiation process, which had already been pushed into a deadlock. According to him, Armenia’s military-political leadership had, to some extent, succeeded in this effort, and the talks were effectively paralyzed. The President noted that Armenia was simultaneously using military escalation to distract its population from severe domestic political, economic, and social problems [28].
In an attempt to perpetuate the occupation, the leader of the illegal criminal regime established in Karabakh held an “inauguration ceremony” in the city of Shusha on May 21, 2020, announcing that the so-called “parliament” would be relocated there. President Ilham Aliyev described this as an unacceptable provocation. Meanwhile, Armenia continued its policy of illegal settlement in the occupied territories. Despite facing a demographic crisis and limited population, Armenia encouraged ethnic Armenians living abroad—particularly those from conflict zones in the Middle East—to settle temporarily in the occupied territories. The President characterized this policy as a violation of the Geneva Conventions and a war crime. Illegal settlement had also reached Shusha. Furthermore, the Armenian side was changing the historical names of Azerbaijani towns and villages, erasing cultural traces, destroying historical monuments, desecrating sacred sites, converting intact mosques into barns, and bulldozing graveyards—acts that clearly revealed the brutal nature of Armenian vandalism [28].
After the Tovuz events, rapid deliveries of weapons to Armenia attracted additional attention. According to available information, from July 17 until early September alone, more than a thousand tons of military cargo were transported to Armenia by air. On September 25, 2020, during a meeting with Toivo Klaar, the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, President Ilham Aliyev stated that Armenia was concentrating its forces along the Azerbaijani border and preparing for new provocations. He declared that any military aggression by Armenia would not go unanswered and urged the European Union to pay due attention to this alarming situation [29].
In another speech delivered in early September, President Aliyev warned both the Armenian leadership and the international community that the threat emanating from Armenia had reached a highly serious level: “They are preparing for a new war. Their forces are concentrating near the line of contact. We see everything. We monitor all their actions. And, of course, we will defend ourselves. Just as we defended ourselves in Tovuz, we will defend ourselves in all other directions as well” [30].
Armenia ignored these warnings and, on September 27, 2020, launched a new large-scale provocation along the line of contact. As soon as this information was confirmed, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Ilham Aliyev, ordered the start of comprehensive counter-offensive operations against Armenia’s aggression. The President expressed the essence of this decisive decision as follows: “We said, enough is enough. This occupation must end — and it will end. As Commander-in-Chief, I ordered the Azerbaijani soldier to move forward, liberate our lands, end the occupation, and punish the aggressor” [31]. Thus began the 44-day war, inscribed in the history of Azerbaijan as the Patriotic War.
Conclusion
Armenia’s state policy for many years was aimed at maintaining and legitimizing the occupation of Azerbaijani territories. To this end, the Armenian military-political leadership employed a broad range of tools — including the construction of advanced fortification lines, deliberate prolongation of negotiations conducted with international mediators, attempts to divert global attention, and continuous military provocations. Especially during the early years of the tenure of Armenia’s most recent prime minister, new and unreasonable demands were introduced into the negotiation process, undermining its logic and pushing it into an impasse. Meanwhile, the intensity of provocations directed against Azerbaijan increased, and statements were made about the possibility of launching a new war with the aim of occupying additional territories.
Despite Azerbaijan repeatedly warning international organizations and the global community about Armenia’s military adventurism, Armenia did not abandon its policy. The provocation committed by Armenia on September 27, 2020, once again demonstrated that the occupying state had no intention of renouncing its aggressive course and that the peaceful resolution of the conflict was no longer feasible. Therefore, in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, Azerbaijan was compelled to launch resolute counter-offensive operations against Armenia’s aggression. These operations culminated in the 44-day Patriotic War, which restored Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.
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