Teodor D. DETCHEV (Bulgaria),

Ph.D., Associate Professor, Head of the Laboratory on the Issues 

of the Black Sea and Caspian regions (LIBCR) in 

Higher School of Security and Economics 

TWO MONTHS THAT TURNED AZERBAIJANI – RUSSIAN RELATIONS UPSIDE DOWN

For many years, Azerbaijan and Russia have maintained generally good-neighborly and more or less friendly relations. There have been plenty of contradictions between the two countries, but thanks to the exceptional tact of the Azerbaijani leadership and, most likely, the serious involvement of the Russian leadership in aggression on the territory of other countries, peaceful relations between Russia and Azerbaijan have been maintained.

In recent weeks, we have seen a sharp deterioration in relations between the two countries and an escalation of tensions between the leadership at different levels. The main reason for this is most likely that the more Moscow gets bogged down in its “special operation” in Ukraine, the more painful are the losses that Russia suffers from Azerbaijan’s policy in the South Caucasus and South-Eastern Europe. And more recently – from Baku’s policy in… Syria. Let’s follow and analyze the events of the last two months.

        The “Syrian Gambit of SOCAR and of the Azerbaijan's State Leadership

On July 12, 2025, during the working visit of Syria’s transitional President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Azerbaijan, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) and the Government of Syria. The document was signed by Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economy and Chairman of SOCAR’s Supervisory Board Mikayil Jabbarov and Syria’s Minister of Energy Mohammed al-Bashir. [1]

Analysts in Baku describe this as “a new direction for Azerbaijani gas” and “a strategic entry into the Middle East energy market.” According to analyst Farid Zohrabov, gas exports previously focused on Europe are now expanding toward the Middle East, signaling the real start of gas supplies to Syria and the restoration of energy infrastructure. Azerbaijan currently exports gas to 12 countries, mainly via the Southern Gas Corridor; with Syria, this number will rise to 13, broadening export geography and reinforcing energy diplomacy. [2]

The main surprise came on August 2, 2025, when a ceremony launching Azerbaijani gas deliveries through Turkey to Syria took place in Kilis, near the Syrian border. The event gathered officials from Azerbaijan, Turkey, Syria, Qatar, and others. Preparations for transportation under the SOCAR-Syria agreement were completed, and the first stage envisions exports of 1.2–2.0 billion cubic meters of gas annually. Supplies through Kilis will feed power plants in Aleppo and Homs, adding 1,200–1,300 megawatts to Syria’s energy capacity. This project marks a significant step in Syria’s reconstruction and further strengthens Turkey’s role as a regional energy hub. [3]

This development provoked strong irritation in Moscow. After investing heavily and suffering major losses, Russia lost control over Syria within days. Following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, sarcastic references to “Kyiv in three days” turned into “Aleppo in three days.” With “Damascus in three days” that followed, Syria—once a Russian outpost—became a new market for Azerbaijani gas. Symbolically, with one signature, Azerbaijan expanded its exports while Russia’s influence waned.

In fact, the memorandum with Syria had been prepared in reverse: first the gas infrastructure was restored, and only later was the public informed that Caspian gas was flowing to the Middle East.

The Hitherto Ignored Possibility of Israeli Intervention in the European Hydrocarbon Market

Moscow faces another major challenge concerning gas infrastructure. Syria’s system is tied to the Arab Gas Pipeline, which runs from Egypt through Jordan to Syria. Both Egypt and Jordan maintain peace treaties and active economic relations with Israel. At the same time, Azerbaijan—Israel’s close ally—uses Israeli-made weapons, including drones that played a decisive role in the 2020 Second Karabakh War, and supplies Israel with oil via the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.

Recently, Azerbaijan acquired a stake in Israel’s Tamar gas field on the Mediterranean shelf. [4] This creates a unique opportunity to transport Israeli gas through Turkey to Europe, as the undersea route to Turkey is far shorter and more practical than the one to Greece. Political tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv have long hindered this option, but Azerbaijan’s participation in the Tamar project changes the dynamics. Maintaining close ties with both countries, Baku could become the bridge enabling Israeli gas to reach Europe. [5]

Until recently, Eastern Mediterranean gas supplies to Europe seemed remote. Now the picture is shifting rapidly. In addition to the existing Southern Gas Corridor (serving Georgia, Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy, Serbia, Moldova, and Ukraine), Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia are joining under the “Solidarity Ring” initiative, while Austria seeks to diversify away from Gazprom. The European energy market is thus gaining an alternative that undermines Russia’s leverage and finances for its war in Ukraine.

The EU’s reassessment of its energy strategy may finally end its previous refusal to fund hydrocarbon pipelines, recognizing natural gas as both industrial raw material and a basis for hydrogen production. Israel’s vast reserves—such as the aptly named “Leviathan” field—are now viewed as export assets rather than domestic reserves.

Given the interconnection between Azerbaijani, Turkish, and Syrian gas networks, and the apparent restoration of the Arab Gas Pipeline, the transportation of natural gas not only from Azerbaijan to Syria but also from Israel through Jordan and Syria to Turkey and Europe becomes technically feasible. In this configuration, Baku emerges as a natural intermediary between Israel and Turkey.

Thus, the export of Israeli gas to Europe is no longer a distant vision but a tangible prospect—another act in the unfolding “Farewell, Gazprom” saga. For years, Moscow derided the Southern Gas Corridor and obstructed the Trans-Caspian Pipeline, delaying it for at least a decade. Meanwhile, Baku and SOCAR made a new move: Azerbaijani gas already flows to Syria, and reverse routes could soon enable Israeli gas exports to Europe.

Russia’s leadership, aware of these developments, likely feels the growing “heat around the corner.” This is a serious geopolitical setback—one made more painful by its timing, overshadowed by the drama of peace talks in Ukraine.

Washington Accords and the Reconciliation between Azerbaijan and Armenia

On August 8, 2025, in Washington, D.C., Azerbaijan and Armenia signed several strategic agreements with the United States and with each other, in the presence of U.S. President Donald Trump. The key document—a Memorandum of Understanding between President Ilham Aliyev and President Trump—established a Strategic Working Group to prepare a Charter of Strategic Partnership between the two countries.

The memorandum also suspends Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in relation to Azerbaijan. According to U.S. political analyst Irina Zuckerman, lifting this long-standing restriction marks a major policy shift:

“Section 907 had limited U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan for decades due to the unresolved conflict with Armenia. Its suspension reflects a pragmatic reassessment of Azerbaijan’s stabilizing role in the South Caucasus and its strategic importance for energy security. It signals that Washington now sees Baku as a pivotal partner in its Eurasian strategy.” [6]

Zuckerman emphasized that the new Memorandum institutionalizes a comprehensive partnership: “By creating a Strategic Working Group, the two countries ensure continuous, structured dialogue on key areas—energy cooperation, infrastructure connectivity between the Caspian, Türkiye, and Europe, and economic diversification. The inclusion of emerging sectors like artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure positions Azerbaijan as a regional innovation hub, while collaboration in defense, counterterrorism, and security consolidates shared strategic interests.”

At the same meeting, Armenia and Azerbaijan, under U.S. mediation, reached an agreement on opening the Zangezur Corridor. Both countries signed exclusive 99-year cooperation agreements with the United States concerning its development, with the option for renewal. President Trump announced the decision after meeting with Ilham Aliyev and Nikol Pashinyan at the White House: “Armenia and Azerbaijan are committing to peace, open trade, travel, and respect for sovereignty. This declaration establishes the ‘Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity,’ giving Azerbaijan access to Nakhchivan while fully respecting Armenia’s sovereignty. U.S. companies will invest heavily in the corridor’s infrastructure, benefiting all three nations.” [7]

While the Zangezur project itself is technically simple and financially feasible for Azerbaijan, its political resolution is of historic significance. The issue, pending since the trilateral statement of Aliyev, Pashinyan, and Putin in November 2020, has finally been settled with a binding 99-year agreement.

Strategically, the Zangezur Corridor will enhance the capacity of the Middle Corridor—linking trade routes between China and the European Union—and reinforce Azerbaijan’s role as a key transit hub. As observers in Baku noted, all that remains is to thank President Trump for his role—and let them name the route after him. [8]

        Putin's Humiliation and Loss of His Role as “Peace Broker” in the South Caucasus

The events in Washington directly contradict Russia’s long-standing strategy of keeping its former colonies—Azerbaijan and Armenia—divided, backing Armenia militarily, and then posing as the region’s sole mediator. With the South Caucasus, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia, slipping from Moscow’s control, the agreements signed in Washington also delivered a reputational blow: neither the leaders of the two states nor U.S. President Donald Trump took Vladimir Putin into account.

Just five years earlier, in November 2020, Putin celebrated the ceasefire that ended the 44-day Second Karabakh War as his personal diplomatic triumph. Acting without the OSCE or any other major power, he positioned himself as the sole broker of peace. Since then, however, Moscow has steadily lost influence—its media presence in Azerbaijan has waned, intelligence operations have been curtailed, and even in Armenia, once a loyal ally, Russia’s role as patron and protector has eroded.

Although Russian troops remain stationed in Armenia and the FSB controls parts of its borders with Iran and Turkey, the Washington accords marked another decisive step in diminishing Moscow’s sway south of the Caucasus Mountains. Symbolically, the event was deeply humiliating for Putin: unlike the modest “trilateral statement” of November 2020, the August 2025 ceremony was grand and public, complete with official documents, photo ops, televised speeches, and even a proposal—initiated by Pashinyan and supported by Aliyev—to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Leaving aside skepticism about Trump’s Nobel ambitions, the symbolism was unmistakable. The signing of the Washington Accords on August 8, 2025—exactly 17 years after the “08.08.08” war, Russia’s assault on Georgia that marked Putin’s attempt at a “great geopolitical return”—served as a striking historical reversal. The accords between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the United States effectively brought Moscow back to square one in the South Caucasus, underscoring the collapse of its influence in a region it once considered its backyard.

Moscow's reaction - jealousy, anger, rage and a hail of drones

The Russian reaction combined envy, malice, and anger. On the night of August 7–8, 2025, coinciding with the signing of the Washington agreements, Russia used drones to strike an Azerbaijani SOCAR oil depot in the Odessa region. The attack caused a fire, damaged a diesel fuel pipeline, and injured four employees. SOCAR operates about 60 gas stations and several depots across Ukraine. [9]

Earlier, on the night of August 6, Russia had targeted a Ukrainian gas compressor station in Orlovka, Odessa region, near the Romanian border. This station is part of the Trans-Balkan pipeline, linking Greek LNG terminals with Ukrainian storage facilities, and also handles Azerbaijani gas supplies. Ukrainian Energy Minister Svetlana Grinchuk condemned the attack: “This is a clear signal to Europe, which plans to abandon Russian gas by 2027. Russia will use all means to undermine European energy independence and alternative supply routes. Impunity only expands terror.” [10]

Unlike the Orlovka station, which is Ukrainian-owned, the August 8 strike directly targeted a foreign company—SOCAR—demonstrating an escalation. Nevertheless, Azerbaijani gas deliveries to Ukraine continued. Haqqin.az cited Reuters reporting that 0.42 million cubic meters of gas were pumped through Orlovka on August 7, maintaining the flow from Greek LNG terminals and Azerbaijan. [12]

Haqqin.az also noted that the Trans-Balkan route provides access to LNG from Greece and Turkey, pipeline gas from Azerbaijan and Romania, and even gas from Bulgaria, highlighting the growing diversity and strategic importance of European gas supply routes.

The coolness of Baku and the quiet joy of Kyiv

The Azerbaijani response to the attacks on its facilities in Ukraine shows no intention of yielding to Russia’s “hints.” On August 10, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. During the conversation, both leaders condemned Russia’s airstrikes on SOCAR facilities in Ukraine, including the Orlovka gas compressor station used for Azerbaijani gas exports, and affirmed that cooperation in the energy sector would continue unabated. [13]

According to Caliber.az, a well-informed site, repeated Russian attacks could prompt Azerbaijan to reconsider its arms embargo on Ukraine, potentially supplying military equipment in response to continued aggression. Russian military observer Yuri Kotenok cited sources claiming that Azerbaijan has already begun producing 122mm and 155mm artillery shells for possible delivery to Ukraine, though the method of transfer—directly or through intermediaries—remains uncertain. [14]

Until now, Azerbaijan officially denies supplying military aid. In July 2025, Hikmet Hajiyev, head of the presidential foreign policy department, told Hospodarske noviny that Azerbaijan maintains good relations with Russia and prioritizes regional stability. He emphasized that Baku supports the territorial integrity of all countries and distances itself from the military conflict, providing only humanitarian assistance and necessary civilian equipment such as electric generators to Ukraine. [15]   

        Demonstrations of even greater rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Ukraine

On August 13, 2025, the first part of a new batch of humanitarian electrical equipment from Azerbaijan departed Sumgait Technology Park for Ukraine. Ordered by President Ilham Aliyev on August 11, the shipment included 90,000 meters of cables and wires, 25 generators, and 7 transformer sets, sent in a convoy of 10 trucks. This aid, valued at $2 million in total, is intended to restore stable power supply to areas affected by the war, with additional shipments planned. [16]

Ukrainian Ambassador Yuriy Gusev expressed gratitude to President Aliyev and the Azerbaijani government for supporting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, noting that this is the second such delivery this year and emphasizing its importance in restoring the integrity of Ukraine’s electrical system. [17][18]

On August 16, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov held a phone conversation with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha. The discussion covered political, economic, energy, transport, and humanitarian cooperation, including the work of the Government Commission on Economic Cooperation. Sybiha congratulated Azerbaijan on its agreements with the United States and progress in normalizing relations with Armenia, and thanked Baku for humanitarian support and reconstruction assistance in conflict-affected areas. [19]

The escalation continues, and the self-restraints of the parties are gradually disappearing

As noted, the attacks on the Orlovka compressor station on August 6, 2025, and the SOCAR oil depot in Odessa on the night of August 7–8 did not halt operations. Russia, facing Ukraine’s resistance and European support for Kiev, continued targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure.

On the night of August 17–18, 2025, SOCAR’s Odessa oil depot was hit again by a larger Russian drone strike, causing direct hits, a fire, and damage to tanks, pumping stations, control rooms, and the fence. The depot, with over 16,000 cubic meters of storage, suffered extensive damage, prompting an Azerbaijani criminal investigation. [20]

Russian media celebrated the attack. Zavtra.RU, citing military blogger “Ribar,” reported the depot’s destruction, highlighting its strategic role in supplying fuel for Ukraine’s armed forces and noting that SOCAR operates additional depots and gas stations across the country. The publication framed Azerbaijan’s support for Ukraine as a legitimate military target, reflecting Moscow’s pragmatic and politically driven perspective rather than any adherence to international law. [21]

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha condemned the attacks: “This night, the Russians attacked SOCAR oil terminals in Odessa. This is the second strike in recent weeks. Moscow is acting deliberately against Azerbaijan’s interests, underscoring the importance of closer Ukraine-Azerbaijan cooperation and the need for a diplomatic and legal response.” [22]

Simultaneously, Azerbaijan-Ukraine parliamentary ties were reinforced. Milli Majlis Chair Sahiba Gafarova and Verkhovna Rada Chair Ruslan Stefanchuk discussed cooperation and mutual visits, expressing confidence that interparliamentary relations would continue to expand through joint efforts both bilaterally and in international forums. [23]

Energy Diplomacy and Conflict Avoidance: Azerbaijan’s Strategy in Russian-Azerbaijani Relations

Undoubtedly, the meeting between President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan and President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation contributed to a certain degree of de-escalation. Tensions had reached a critical point, and from that moment onward, the parties faced a clear choice: either take measures to calm the situation or move toward open conflict.

It is evident that neither side had an interest in further escalation at this juncture, particularly Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s strategy is inherently constructive, grounded in rational energy expansion and the cultivation of mutually beneficial relations with all countries willing to engage with Baku.

Unlike Russia, which regards its gas pipelines as instruments of geopolitical leverage, Azerbaijan adheres to the principles of fair trade, the first rule of which is that all parties should benefit from a transaction. Unlike Russia, which abandoned the world’s most lucrative and “demanding” energy markets—the European markets—Azerbaijan methodically expands its presence there, thereby also increasing its influence. The contrast between these two approaches is striking, representing movement in fundamentally opposite directions.

In this context, Azerbaijan is entirely justified in seeking to avoid escalation of confrontation with the Russian Federation. Regrettably, there are circumstances beyond the control of Azerbaijan’s leadership, foremost among them being Vladimir Putin’s fixation on the war in Ukraine. Personally, I hold reservations about President Trump for a number of reasons that are not relevant here, but I believe he does not exaggerate when he tells President Zelensky that Putin is prepared to erase Ukraine from the map.

In this regard, two developments particularly exacerbate Putin’s nervousness: Azerbaijan’s role in mitigating the negative consequences of the suspension of Russian natural gas supplies across Southeastern Europe—including Russia’s allies Serbia and Hungary—and Azerbaijan’s firm support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine. It is difficult to imagine anything more irritating to the President of the Russian Federation than these two realities, and they must not be overlooked. At any moment, the Russian side might take extreme measures, which could later be regretted but would cause considerable immediate damage. One can easily imagine the potential scope of such actions, although the range of possibilities is broad.

From a personal perspective, Azerbaijan enjoys an additional advantage in the context of the interaction between the two heads of state. President Ilham Aliyev possesses a significant biographical advantage. Undoubtedly, Vladimir Putin, in part for biographical reasons, holds a deep respect for Heydar Aliyev, the national leader of Azerbaijan. (On a side note, while I personally find the Russian system of “Russification of names” objectionable, in this instance I retained the conventional transliteration of Heydar Aliyev, which has become the norm. As you may have noticed, I generally avoid Russian-style transliterations of names.) By contrast, Putin’s career in security services cannot be described as distinguished, whereas Heydar Aliyev served as head of the Azerbaijani KGB and Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Regardless of the strength of Putin’s ego, it is likely that in meeting President Ilham Aliyev, he perceives before him a symbolic representation of both father and son—the figures of Heydar and Ilham Aliyev. For understandable reasons, including Aliyev’s extensive erudition, high level of expertise in international affairs, and evident success in governance, Ilham Aliyev commands Putin’s respect. In addition, when confronted with the figure of Heydar Aliyev, Putin experiences not only respect but genuine apprehension, which I would characterize as bordering on superstitious fear.

Consequently, there exist factors that restrain Putin in his dissatisfaction with Azerbaijan, which serves as an evident obstacle to his ambitions of energy imperialism and even military expansion. These factors include, of course, Azerbaijan’s assistance to Ukraine in restoring its energy and electricity transmission infrastructure. Other relevant elements are the well-armed, highly trained, and battle-tested Azerbaijani armed forces, as well as Azerbaijan’s close ties with Turkey and other member states of the Organization of Turkic States. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy has clearly achieved successes that act as a brake on the unchecked wrath of the Russian autocrat.

Nevertheless, despite these positive circumstances, it is crucial to remember that fundamental issues in Russian-Azerbaijani relations persist. Russia is retreating from Europe, whereas Azerbaijan is advancing. Russia considers Ukraine to be its domain, while Azerbaijan supports the country’s territorial integrity. Russia has lost substantial geopolitical and geo-economic influence in Southeastern Europe—first due to its own miscalculations, and second because Azerbaijan has emerged in its stead, conducting itself with far greater competence.

Importantly, Azerbaijan does not seek to impose an “Azerbaijani world,” nor does it pose a military threat to any European country, in stark contrast to Russia.

Bibliography:

1. Mammadov, Inglab. SOCAR and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic signed a Memorandum of Understanding. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/en/socar-and-government-syrian-arab-republic-signed-memorandum-understanding 

2. Zohrabov, Farid. New direction for Azerbaijani gas: Strategic entry into the Middle East energy market. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/new-direction-azerbaijani-gas-strategic-entry-middle-east-energy-market 

3. Javadov, Sadig. Azerbaijani gas exports to Syria begin. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/azerbaijani-gas-exports-syria-begin 

4. Zeynalova, Laman. SOCAR acquires stake in Israel’s Tamar field. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/ru/socar-priobrela-dolyu-v-izrailskom-mestorozhdenii-tamar 

5. Detchev, Teodor. SOCAR's participation in the development of Israel's Tamar gas field is a key event for the energy security of a number of European countries. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/socars-participation-development-israels-tamar-gas-field-key-event-energy-security-number-european 

6. Zeynalova, Laman. Suspension of Section 907 to demonstrate new vector in US-Azerbaijan relations – analyst. - https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4078556.html 

7. Zeynalova, Laman. Donald Trump: The Trump route to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhchivan. - https://ru.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4078628.html 

8. Zohrabov, Farid. U.S. President Donald Trump delivers press statement at White House. - https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/4078626.html 

9. Russia strikes Azerbaijani oil and gas facilities in Ukraine, Baku prepares response. - https://caliber.az/en/post/russia-strikes-azerbaijani-oil-and-gas-facilities-in-ukraine-azerbaijan-prepares-response 

10. Russia strikes compressor station in Odessa region through which Azerbaijani gas flows to Ukraine (in Russian). - https://www.currenttime.tv/a/rossiya-udarila-po-kompressornoy-stantsii-v-odesskoy-oblasti-cherez-kotoruyu-v-ukrainu-postupaet-azerbaydzhanskiy-gaz/33496020.html 

11. Baku accused Russia of striking Azerbaijani targets in Ukraine (in Russian). - https://hronika.kz/news/baku-obvinil-rossiyu-v-udarah-po-obektam-azerbajdzhana-v-ukraine/ 

12. Gas pipeline in Ukraine continues to operate after Russian attack: Azerbaijani gas flows through it (in Russian). - https://haqqin.az/news/356356  

13. Zohrabov, Farid, President Ilham Aliyev and Zelenskyy condemn Russia's targeted airstrikes on SOCAR oil depot in Ukraine. - https://www.trend.az/azerbaijan/4079099.html 

14. Lepehina, Evgeniya, Aliyev Accuses Russia of Striking Azerbaijani Facilities in Ukraine (in Russian). - https://rtvi.com/news/aliev-obvinil-rossiyu-v-udarah-po-obektam-azerbajdzhana-na-ukraine/ 

15. Aliyev's assistant clarified the situation with the help of Azerbaijan to Ukraine (in Russian). - https://www.interfax.ru/world/1035078 

16. Javadov, Sadig, Ukraine thanks Azerbaijan for critical humanitarian aid. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/en/ukraine-thanks-azerbaijan-critical-humanitarian-aid 

17. Mustavayev, Zaur, Azerbaijan dispatches next humanitarian aid shipment to Ukraine containing electrical equipment. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/azerbaijan-dispatches-next-humanitarian-aid-shipment-ukraine-containing-electrical-equipment 

18. Pavlenko, Alyona, Ukraine expresses its deep gratitude to President Ilham Aliyev for humanitarian aid. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/ukraine-expresses-its-deep-gratitude-president-ilham-aliyev-humanitarian-aid 

19. Mammad, Basti, Azerbaijan and Ukraine discuss current issues of partnership relations. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/azerbaijan-and-ukraine-discuss-current-issues-partnership-relations 

20. Garayev, Rashid, Russia hits SOCAR oil depot in Odesa in second drone attack. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/russia-hits-socar-oil-depot-odesa-second-drone-attack 

21. Ivanov, Alexey, “A great strike on the Azerbaijani oil depot in Odessa” (in Russian). - https://zavtra.ru/events/otlichnij_udar_po_azerbajdzhanskoj_neftebaze_v_odesse 

22. Ahmedova, Maryana, Ukrainian FM on Russian strike on SOCAR oil depot: Moscow acts against Azerbaijan’s interests. - https://blacksea-caspia.eu/index.php/en/ukrainian-fm-russian-strike-socar-oil-depot-moscow-acts-against-azerbaijans-interests 

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Teodor D. DETCHEV (Bulgaria),

Ph.D., Associate Professor, Head of the Laboratory on the Issues of the 

Black Sea and Caspian regions (LIBCR) 

in Higher School of Security and Economics 

TWO MONTHS THAT TURNED AZERBAIJANI – RUSSIAN RELATIONS UPSIDE DOWN

The significance of the Washington agreements between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and the USA is assessed, particularly in light of Russia’s likely negative reaction and the personal implications for President Putin, including his loss of the “peace broker” role in the South Caucasus. Russia’s real response to Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, including the two attacks on SOCAR’s Odessa oil depot and attempts to disrupt Azerbaijani gas supplies via the Trans-Balkan route, is analyzed, along with Azerbaijan’s measured response and deepening ties with Kyiv. The article observes escalating tensions and diminishing restraints, including the triumphalist reaction of Russian military bloggers to the Odessa attack.

A forecast for Azerbaijan–Russia relations in the near and medium term is offered: while direct Russian military action is relatively unlikely, diversionary and sabotage measures remain possible. Russia may attempt to hinder the final peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, posing risks to Azerbaijan and to the energy security of Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Southeastern Europe. The author underscores the necessity for Bulgaria to adopt policy measures based on this understanding.

Теодор Д. ДЕЧЕВ (Болгария),

доктор социологии, доцент, руководитель Лаборатории по проблемам 

Черноморского и Каспийского регионов (ЛПЧКР) 

в Высшей Школе Безопасности и Экономики

ДВА МЕСЯЦА, КОТОРЬIЕ ПЕРЕВЕРНУЛИ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНО-РОССИЙСКИЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ

Резюме. В статье анализируется резкое обострение отношений между Азербайджаном и Россией в последние месяцы (статья завершена 18.10.2025). Рассматривается выход SOCAR на рынок природного газа Ближнего Востока как диверсификация экспорта Азербайджана и как геополитический вызов для России. Обсуждается возможность будущего экспорта израильского газа в Европу через азербайджанскую и турецкую инфраструктуру как шанс для диверсификации энергоимпорта ЕС и как угроза возвращению «Газпрома» на европейские рынки.

Анализируются Вашингтонские соглашения между Азербайджаном, Арменией и США с учётом вероятной негативной реакции России и психологических аспектов утраты Путиным роли «миротворца» на Южном Кавказе. Рассматривается реальная реакция Москвы на внешнюю политику Азербайджана, включая атаки на нефтебазу SOCAR в Одессе и попытки прервать поставки газа по трансбалканскому маршруту. Отмечается хладнокровная реакция Баку и укрепление отношений с Киевом на фоне растущей враждебности России.

Прогнозируется дальнейшее развитие отношений Азербайджана и России: прямые военные действия маловероятны, но возможны диверсии и саботаж, а Россия может попытаться препятствовать подписанию окончательного мирного договора между Арменией и Азербайджаном. Это создаёт угрозу для Азербайджана и энергетической безопасности Грузии, Турции, Болгарии, Греции, Италии и всей Юго-Восточной Европы. Автор подчёркивает, что болгарская политика должна исходить из этого понимания.